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Abstract
This paper examines household income inequality in the South African October Household
Survey datasets between 1995 and 1999, the Labour Force Survey 2000, and the Income and Ex-
penditure Surveys 1995 and 2000. The paper reﬂects both on changing patterns of income inequality
in South Africa, and on the quality and comparability of the data employed. We employ several
measures of income inequality, employing nominal income and expenditure data from South Africa
over the 1995-2000 period. Results prove sensitive to the choice of welfare measure. Furthermore,
results from income data and expenditure data provide contrasting results. On self-reported income
data, our ﬁndings are that inequality measures increased over the 1995 - 2000 time period. While
we do not attach much credence to the evidence for reasons attaching to data quality, there is
nevertheless evidence suggesting that the general increase in inequality for the African race group
also hides a decrease in inequality for the bottom 1
3 of the income distribution, and (more unam-
biguously) a widening of inequality for the middle 1
3 of the income distribution for Africans. There
is also some evidence of a narrowing inequality amongst rich households for the population as a
whole. This suggests that there is at least some evidence consistent with a successful redistribution
of income from richest to poorest households, though this has not yet reversed the high aggregate
level of inequality in South Africa. Evidence from inequality measures based on expenditure data
reverse the ﬁndings based on self-reported income. Where there is evidence of an increase in in-
equality, in most instances this proves to be statistically insigniﬁcant. On some measures African
as well as total population inequality has declined signiﬁcantly, and for a number of racial groups
inequality has remained unchanged. The central conclusion of the paper is therefore that there is
much contradictory evidence that emerges from household level data on income inequality - sug-
gesting that the choice of data set is non-trivial in drawing inference on income inequality in South
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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with two questions.
Inequality has been a perennial feature of income and welfare in South Africa. The
democratic transition of 1994 oﬀered the opportunity not only of redressing imbalances in
access to formal political rights. It also aﬀorded the opportunity of redressing inequality
of economic opportunity. The ﬁrst question is whether the available household survey data
shed any light on whether income inequality has been subject to change over the 1995 - 2000
time frame.
The second question of the paper addresses data quality issues. South Africa is one of
a growing number of developing countries for which cross sectional household survey data
is becoming available for repeated years. For users of such data a crucial question is its
reliability. A reﬂection of this general concern has been the debate around the quality of in-
come data collected in the October Household Surveys (OHS) conducted by Statistics South
Africa (StatsSA). In the present paper we concern ourselves with income data speciﬁcally.
Although it is widely believed that expenditure data is superior to income data, the latter
could still be useful in examining a country’s income distribution in the absence of more re-
liable data. Income and expenditure surveys (IES) collected detailed information on income
and expenditure patterns in 1995 and 2000.
The second objective of the paper is therefore to compare and contrast the results ob-
tained on income inequality obtained from expenditure data with those obtained from income
data. In the process, we hope to draw some more general inferences on the quality of the
income data obtained from the various surveys employed for this study.
Our ﬁndings are that, using income data, inequality in South Africa has increased over
the 1995-2000 time frame. This is regardless of whether we employ the two IES data sets
for 1995 and 2000, or the four OHS data sets for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, and regardlessChallenging Cassandra 3
of which race group is considered.
However, evidence from inequality measures based on expenditure data reverse this ﬁnd-
ing. Where there is evidence of an increase in inequality, in most instances this proves to be
statistically insigniﬁcant (though there are two countervailing instances). On some measures
African as well as total population inequality has declined (signiﬁcantly), and for a number
of racial groups inequality has remained unchanged.
Thus if any increase in inequality has occured, inequality measures based on expenditure
data suggest that the increase is more muted than that suggested by self-reported income
(and may be entirely absent), and certainly the increase (if any) is less clearly concentrated
in the African population group.
The paper also examines intradistributional changes in inequality, by examining inequal-
ity in the bottom, middle and top income ranges, and also proportions of households ranked
by income. The evidence from these intradistributional ranges further confounds any sug-
gestion of unambiguous increases in inequality. The evidence proves very sensitive to the
speciﬁc income range or household proportion analyzed, to the decomposition employed to
arrive at intradistributional ranges, and to the data employed.
W h i l ew ed on o ta t t a c hm u c hc r e d e n c et ot h ee v i d e n c ef o rd a t aq u a l i t yr e a s o n s ,t h e r e
is nevertheless evidence suggesting that the general increase in inequality for the African
race group hides a decrease in inequality for the bottom 1
3 o ft h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o n ,a n d
(more unambiguously) a widening of inequality for the middle 1
3 of the income distribution
for Africans. There is also some evidence of narrowing inequality amongst rich households
for the population as a whole. This suggests that there is at least some evidence consistent
with a successful redistribution of income from richest to poorest households, though this
has not yet reversed the high aggregate level of inequality in South Africa.
The upshot of the paper is that there is much contradictory evidence that emerges from
household level data on income inequality - both rising and falling inequality can be inferred
from the evidence, suggesting that the choice of data set is non-trivial in drawing inference
on income inequality in South Africa.
Moreover, the conclusion to emerge on the quality of the data examined for this study, isChallenging Cassandra 4
that it leaves much to be desired. Examination of the distributions of income and expenditure
data over successive years raises serious concerns about the validity of analysis conducted on
t h ed a t a .T h i si sb o r n eo u tb yt h em o r ed e t a i l e de v i d e n c er e p o r t i n gi n e q u a l i t ym e a s u r e si n
the study. Often both the order of implied magnitude of changes in the inequality measures,
as well as the suggested level of inequality prove to be implausible.
The most general implication is that at least for South Africa, evidence on income in-
equality from household surveys must be treated with some caution when inferring policy
conclusions.
Section 2 of the paper introduces the measures of inequality employed for the present
study. Section 3 introduces the data sets employed. Section 4 reports the results and
comparisons of income inequality. Section 5 concludes.
2. Measures of Inequality
We employ three distinct measures of inequality in the results which follow. Two of the
measures, the Gini coeﬃcient and Theil’s entropy measure, are standard to the literature,
and thus receive only cursory coverage.1 Pareto’s inequality measure is no longer widely
employed. There are good reasons for the loss of popularity of the measure, and we point
these out. However, the Pareto measure nevertheless proves useful in the context of the
current study since it serves to identify changes in the distribution of income over high
income ranges. As we suggest in the empirical results section of the paper, such changes
prove to be potentially important in the South African context.
While Dalton (1920) identiﬁed a number of distinct criteria against which measures of
inequality might be assessed, modern authors focus on whether inequality measures satisfy
what is termed the principle of transfers, viz. that inequality will be decreased by any
transfer of income from a richer to a poorer person, provided only that the transfer does not
reverse the relative position of the two individuals.2 Both the Gini coeﬃcient and Theil’s
entropy measure satisfy the principle of transfers. Pareto’s inequality measure implies a
uniformity of distribution, which makes it impossible to apply the principle of transfers to
the Pareto measure - one of the reasons for its disappearance from the literature (see theChallenging Cassandra 5
more detailed discussion below).
2.1. Gini Coeﬃcient
The Gini coeﬃcient applied to income is deﬁned as the arithmetic average of the moduli
of the diﬀerences between all possible income pairs,3 divided by the arithmetic mean of









njnk |xj − xk| (1)
where N is the total number of units of measurement (eg. households, individuals), µ is
the arithmetic mean of the income measure, m denotes the income classes in the sample, ni
denotes the number of units of measurement in the income class i,a n dx denotes the income
o ft h eu n i to fm e a s u r e m e n t .T h eG i n im e a s u r ei ss u c ht h a t0 ≤ G ≤ 1,w i t hG =0indicating
perfect equality, and G =1concentration of income on a single unit of measurement.
2.2. Theil’s Entropy Measure














where N denotes the population size, xi the measure of living standards (here, as generally,
total or per capita household income or expenditure), and µ the mean of the x’s. The
Theil entropy measure is such that 0 ≤ IT ≤ lnN,w i t hIT =0indicating perfect equality,
IT =l nN concentration of income on a single unit of measurement.
2.3. Pareto’s α Measure
Given the lack of modern usage of the Pareto measure of inequality, we provide a little
more detail with respect to this statistic.
The origin of the proposed measure is inductive. An examination of the cumulative
distribution of income for England, a range of Italian cities, a number of German states,Challenging Cassandra 6
Paris and Peru, led Pareto to propose that:
N (x)=Ax
−α (3)
⇒ lnN (x)=l n A − αlnx (4)
where N (x) denotes the number of incomes greater than x,a n dA and α are constant
parameters.4 Given that α →∞would imply a decreasing number of income units with
high incomes, higher absolute values of the α parameter are interpreted as implying lower





Thus average income over any arbitrary x is given by the constant multiple, α
α−1.
Pareto claimed that α proves constant across both time and societies (given the range
of data he considered), approximating 1.5, leading him to the assertion of a “law” of in-
come distribution.7 Indeed, Allen (1956: 408) continued to aﬃrm α =1 .5. Application of
Pareto’s law proved wide-spread, with Clark (1951) reporting over 150 estimates from dif-
ferent countries, and diﬀerent time-points. More modern applications of Pareto’s law show
greater variability in the value of α, implying a change in developed country α-estimates from
1.6 − 1.8 in the nineteenth to 1.9 − 2.1 in the twentieth century, thus implying a reduction
in inequality over time - see Cramer (1969: 56-7).
A number of points are worth noting in evaluating the Pareto inequality measure.
First, while Pareto held his “law” to hold over the entire domain of income, subsequent
analysis suggested that the log-linear relationship in (4) held only for some lower limit x0,
generally held to exceed the mode of the income distribution, and often found to hold for less
than half of all income recipients in the distribution. The discrepancy between Pareto’s and
subsequent ﬁndings is readily explained: Pareto’s estimations were conducted on income tax
data, which in the nineteenth century did not extend to lower income groups. Application
of Pareto’s inequality measure is thus subject to potential charges of being ad hoc in its
choice of x0. On the other hand, provided only that the log-linearity of (4) is an adequateChallenging Cassandra 7
approximation, as long as the choice of x0 is suﬃciently aggressive in excluding low incomes,
estimates of α s h o u l dp r o v et ob ei n s e n s i t i v et ot h ec h o i c eo fx0. The more serious limitation
of the Pareto measure is that it restricts itself to a consideration of one tail of the income
distribution. Use of the measure is therefore relevant only where the characteristics of the
tail are of interest - as they may be in contexts of extreme inequality.
Second,g i v e nN (x)=Ax−α, x>x 0, α>0,l e tx∗ = x
x0 ≥ 1, with associated probability
distribution F (x∗)=1−x∗−α, and density f (x∗)=αx∗−(1+α). The mean of the distribution
is then given by E (x∗)=
R ∞
1 αx∗−αdx∗ = α
α−1,t h ev a r i a n c eb yE (x∗2)=
R ∞
1 αx∗(1−α)dx∗.
This raises a potential problem for the Pareto inequality measure. For α<1, E (x∗)=
R ∞
1 αx∗−αdx∗ is non-convergent, precluding the existence of a ﬁnite mean to the distribution.
For α<2, E (x∗2)=
R ∞
1 αx∗(1−α)dx∗ is non-convergent, precluding the existence of a ﬁnite
variance to the distribution. Given that empirically 1 < b α<2, the implication is that while
the implied income distribution has a ﬁnite mean, the variance is inﬁnite.
One solution is to infer the variance from the necessarily ﬁnite sample variance where
required. Another solution is provided by Mandelbrot (1960, 1961). The requirement is
that incomes of earning units are additive over the independent random variables (which
constitute the alternative income sources) with the same distribution up to some linear
transformation of their scale, and that the common distribution that they share is one that
approaches Pareto’s law. Then asymptotically for large values of the random variable,8 the
distribution of the summation is Pareto-Lévy,9 such that it is stable,10 with ﬁnite mean,
inﬁnite variance, and maximum right-skewness. Mandelbrot thus demonstrates that the
distribution of incomes required by Pareto is feasible for 1 <α<2.A ﬁnal solution is to
note that there exists a class of stochastic process models that lead to stationary distributions
that have Pareto tails. Champernowne (1953) provides an explicit application to income,
while Simon (1955) and Steindl (1965) are also of relevance.11
Finally, attacks on Pareto’s law have been sustained. For instance, we have already noted
that subsequent research found α to vary considerably both over time and society - a point
argued for from the outset by Pigou (1912) for instance. Pigou (1912) and Dalton (1920)
argued forcefully that institutions mattered a great deal in determining income distribution.Challenging Cassandra 8
Disputes on the goodness of ﬁt of Pareto’s law were also mounted virtually from the outset.12
Despite these attacks Pareto’s law continued to ﬁnd adherents, primarily because of the
extent to which good ﬁt to the data was achieved on the basis of a very simple summary
measure.13
One criticism that appears incontrovertible, however, is that Pareto’s α strictly applies
only to high incomes - or at least to incomes above some lower bound. Use of the measure
therefore presupposes that there is a special interest in high incomes rather than inequality
over the full range of income. Where inequality is high, and the tail of the income distribution
particularly pronounced, such an interest is indeed justiﬁed. Policy makers may have an
interest in examining whether redistributive measures are serving to alter the strength of the
tail of the income distribution. It is in this vein that we consider the evidence for the South
A f r i c a nc a s eo nP a r e t o ’ sα.
3. Data
The data employed for this study is derived from a number of distinct sources. These
include the Income and Expenditure Surveys (IES) of 1995 and 2000, the Labour Force
Survey (LFS) of 2000, and the October Household Surveys (OHS) of 1996, 1997, 1998, and
1999.
Use of a series of cross sectional data sets has advantages, but also raises some method-
ological problems. In Appendix 1 of the paper we detail some of the problems that arise
from the compilation of the income and expenditure data. What stands out in particular is
that the 1995 and the 2000 data is derived from detailed income and expenditure surveys.
We matched information for the 1995 IES with the 1995 OHS, and the 2000 IES with the
2000 LFS. By contrast, for 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 only OHS data was available, and to-
tal household income variables had to be constructed from the information in the OHS data
sets. There is thus a fundamental diﬀerence between the 1995 and 2000 data set pairing, and
the data sets obtained for other years. As we will report in greater detail in what follows,
the distinction between the data sets is clearly evident in the results.
Weighted data is used throughout the study - with the single exception of the proportionChallenging Cassandra 9
of the population falling below various poverty lines reported in Table 3 below.14
The literature on poverty and inequality measurement has established a preference for the
use of data based on consumption, rather than data on reported income directly.15 For South
Africa consumption data is not available, and expenditure data is the closest approximation
available.16 In the present paper we nevertheless proceed with a consideration of income and
expenditure data, for two distinct reasons. The ﬁrst is that a comparison between the results
obtained on income and expenditure data for 1995 and 2000 aﬀords the opportunity of some
inferences on the quality of the income data collected in the South African household surveys,
as well as comparing the consistency of results from income and expenditure data. Second,
the primary analytical concern of the present study is to establish whether there exists a
trend in the inequality measures computed on the income and expenditure data collected
in South African household surveys. Given this focus of the study, even where income data
may suﬀer from bias, as long as the magnitude and direction of bias remains consistent over
time, results on inequality computed on income data may continue to provide useful insight
into inequality patterns in South Africa.
Two ﬁnal points need to be borne in mind by readers when considering the evidence
presented below. The income and expenditure data has not been converted to a real scale.
The price indices available for South Africa are available for geographically disaggregated
metropolitan and urban areas.17 Deﬂating nominal income by such indices presumes that the
consumption bundles, and hence the price indexes that apply to rich and poor households
are homogeneous. But where this assumption is satisﬁed, the need for deﬂation is obviated.
Where a common price index applies to the income streams of rich and poor households,
t h eG i n ic o m p u t e do nn o m i n a li n c o m ei se q u i v a l e n tt ot h a tc o m p u t e do nr e a li n c o m e .O n e
should note, however, that for the South African context the assumption that the same rate
of inﬂation in nominal income applies to rich and poor households is unlikely to hold. The
majority of the poorest members of South African society are unemployed, and thus are likely
to realize lower rates of adjustment to nominal income than those in formal employment.
Under these circumstances deﬂation of income across rich and poor households by a common
price index will introduce a clear and potentially substantial bias to inequality measures.Challenging Cassandra 10
Given that we cannot assume homogeneity of price indexes across income groups in South
Africa, absent the existence of more disaggregated price indexes, and given the homogneity
of degree zero of inequality measures, we believe that there is little to be gained from the
use of real rather than nominal data.
The ﬁnal point to note is that we have employed both total household income as well
as per capita household income in the computation of our inequality measures. While the
discussion focuses primarily on the per capita income ﬁgures, inequality of household incomes
in the South African context potentially carries some additional information that may be of
interest to readers.
Tables 1 and 2 respectively report the summary statistics for the total household income
and per capita household income variables obtained from the data sets under considera-
tion, while Figure 1 reports the frequency distributions of the per capita household income
variables over the six data sets.18
A number of features are worth noting in the summary statistics.
First, a source of concern is that the mean income from 1995 - 2000 has declined, despite
the use of nominal income data. By contrast, mean household income obtained from the
use of the OHS income data shows a more plausible monotonically upward trend. A related
matter is that income obtained from the two IES data sets lies above that of the income levels
obtained from the OHS data. One interpretation is that the income data from the OHS’s is
inherently unreliable. Another, is that it conﬁrms the conventional downward bias to income
data.19 W h e r ew ea r ec o n c e r n e dw i t ht h et r e n di ni n e q u a l i t yo v e rt i m e ,t h ed o w n w a r db i a s
is of reduced concern, as long as it remains consistent. However the presence of the bias does
require a clear separation of the data sets based on income from those based on expenditure
data.
Second, the conventional right-skewness of income data is generally found in all of the
data sets when we look at per capita income. The exception is 1996, and the more marginal
case of 1998. The left-skewness of 1996 conﬁrms the possibility of data collection problems
with lower incomes in 1996 noted in the Appendix 1.
Third, questions also arise with respect to the collection of income data for the 1999 OHS.Challenging Cassandra 11
W h i l et h es u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c sa r en o tm a r k e d l yo u to fl i n ew i t ht h o s eo ft h eo t h e rO H S ’ s ,
the discrete nature of the frequency distribution of income does point to the presence of
potentially signiﬁcant problems with this data set. Appendix 1 indicates problems associated
with the net income of the self-employed, as well as non-wage income.
We note that the cumulative density functions (CDF) by race for income consistently
conﬁrm the standard ﬁnding that the CDF for Africans stochastically dominates that for
Coloureds, whose CDF dominates that for Indians, who in turn dominate the CDF for
Whites (See Figure 2). The only exception to this ﬁnding is in 1996, where Indian and
White incomes at the lower end of the distribution for the two race groups fail to show
clear stochastic dominance at low income levels. Thus the standard income order amongst
South Africa’s racial groups is present in the data. Figure 3 reports the CDF over the
1995-2000 time frame for each racial grouping. Again with the exception of 1996, the CDF’s
demonstrate the clear rightward migration of the distribution that one would anticipate with
the use of nominal data.
Table 3 reports the proportion of the population that has fallen below a set of poverty
lines set at R87, R174, R322 in 2000 prices.20 For earlier years the poverty line is discounted
at a 10% rate of inﬂation from their 2000 values. Note that where the imputed rate of
inﬂation is too high, this would serve to understate poverty in earlier years, and vice versa
where imputed inﬂation is too low.
The ﬁrst point to note from the evidence is that the proportion of the population that falls
below the three poverty measures is substantially lower than that reported in Hoogeveen and
Özler (2003), on all measures, and for both years in which the data sets overlap. Second, we
note that between 1995 and 2000, the proportion of the population falling below the poverty
lines has been rising. This is particularly noticeable for the total population, and the African
population group - a ﬁnding consistent with that of Hoogeveen and Özler (2003). However,
there is a distinction between the poverty counts obtained from the OHS data sets, and the
IES data sets. Over the 1996-99 period the proportion of the population that has fallen
below the “low” poverty line has been falling, for both the total population and the African
population group - in contrast to the upward trend in poverty between the 1995 and 2000Challenging Cassandra 12
IES data sets. One interpretation of the evidence is thus that results are sensitive to the
data employed. It also suggests that the Hoogeveen and Özler (2003) result of rising poverty
may well be sensitive to the choice of data sets.
4. Results
In discussing the results to emerge from the three inequality measures, we turn ﬁrst to
the evidence to emerge for changes in inequality for the population in aggregate, as well as
by racial group, over the 1995 - 2000 period. In discussing the evidence, we begin with a
consideration of the results to emerge from both the Gini and the Theil entropy measures.
A second set of results then considers changing patterns of inequality to emerge from the
distribution of income over sub-samples of the p o p u l a t i o n so b s e r v e di nt h i ss t u d y .T h u sw e
consider inequality for the bottom, middle and top 1
3 of the population deﬁn e db o t hi nt e r m s
o ft h ei n c o m er a n g eo b s e r v e di nt h es a m p l e ,a sw e l la si nt e r m so ft h en u m b e ro fh o u s e h o l d s .
The analysis extends to both the South African population as a whole, as well as to the
racial groups standard to South African economic analysis. We repeat the exercise for the
bottom 3
4 and top 1
4 of the population again on the two alternative decompositions.
Finally, we consider the evidence on inequality to emerge for the top end of the South
African income distribution, utilizing Pareto’s measure of inequality.
Throughout, we report the standard errors that attach to the inequality measures. For
the Gini and Teil measures, the standard errors were obtained by bootstrapping, on 1000
replications.
We note at the outset that the conclusions implied by the total household income data, are
broadly consistent with those drawn from the per capita household income data. However,
t h o s et oe m e r g ef r o mt h ee x p e n d i t u r ea n dt h ei n c o m ed a t aa r en o t . W h i l et h ei n c o m e
data imply an increase in inequality, both in aggregate and for the individual race groups,
the expenditure data does not. Instead, expenditure data suggests inequality to have been
constant or declining.Challenging Cassandra 13
4.1. The full population results
Our ﬁrst concern is with changing patterns of inequality in the South African population
as a whole, as well as for the standard racial groups within the South African population.
We report the Gini coeﬃcients and Theil entropy measures for the South African popu-
lation as a whole as well as by race, for total household income in Table 4 and for per capita
household income in Table 5. The results also report inequality results for both expenditure
and income where both forms of data are available (1995 and 2000).
We begin by noting that for inequality measures based on self-reported income, regardless
of the inequality measure employed, the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the household
income and per capita household income data lies in the magnitude of inequality indicated.
The Gini coeﬃcient and Theil entropy measure for per capita income consistently lie above
those for total household income, an expression of the fact that poor households also tend
to have more members.21
On self-reported income data the inequality measures indicate that for the South African
population as a whole income inequality has been rising - and statistically signiﬁcantly so.
This is irrespective of whether we are considering household income, whether we are consid-
ering per capita household income, and irrespective of the measure of inequality employed.
Moreover, it is regardless of whether we consider the 1995/2000 data set pairing (henceforth
95/00), or the 1996/1997/1998/1999 data sets (henceforth 96/99). Figure 4 illustrates for
t h ec a s eo ft h ep e rc a p i t ah o u s e h o l di n c o m ec a s eo nt h eG i n ic o e ﬃc i e n t-r e s u l t sf o rt h eT h e i l
are symmetrical.
Unsurprisingly, intra-racial income inequality is lower than the aggregate income in-
equality. Of the intra-racial income inequalities, inequality is consistently strongest amongst
Africans, followed by Coloureds, Indians and Whites. Africans also observed the strongest
increase in inequality followed by Coloureds. Again, these ﬁndings are consistent across
both the 95/00, and 96/99 data set groupings, as well as across the two inequality measures
employed. Note, however, that the 1996 data set may bias upward the inequality measure
for Africans and Coloureds (see the discussion of this data set in the preceding section, and
in the data appendix).Challenging Cassandra 14
One source of diﬀerence across the Gini and Theil measures arises with respect to inequal-
ity amongst Whites and Indians. On the Gini measure movements in inequality amongst
Whites and Indians are ambiguous. Consideration of the 95/00 data set pairing suggests an
increase in inequality for both Indians and Whites, though the extent of the increase is more
muted than for Africans and Coloureds. By contrast, the 96/99 data set grouping indicates
a somewhat stronger increase in inequality for Indians and Whites over the 1996-98 period,
only to be reversed in the 1999 data set. One plausible explanation is provided by the fact
that the 1999 data set collects self-employed income poorly (see the preceding section and
the data appendix), which would bias higher income groupings downward particularly for
Indians and Whites. The 1999 inequality measure for these two racial groupings is thus
likely to be an understatement. Inequality is thus likely to have increased for Indians and
Whites also.
By contrast, the Theil entropy measure results for Whites and Indians show a consistent
movement over time. In particular, movements in inequality amongst Whites and Indians
are consistent across the two groupings of data sets, and suggest a small change in inequality,
with Indians reporting a decline over the period, and Whites a moderate increase.22
While the inequality ﬁndings to emerge from the data are therefore plausibly consistent
across data sets and inequality measures when computed on self-reported income, ﬁndings
with respect to income measures based on reported expenditure generate contrasting results.
For household income inequality measures, on the Gini coeﬃcient inequality either remains
constant over the 95/00 data set pairing, or declines marginally for some racial groups
(African, Indian), though any recorded movement in inequality is statistically insigniﬁcant.
By contrast, for household income on the Theil entropy measure, the index shows a statis-
tically insigniﬁcant increase in inequality for the population as a whole, for Coloureds, and
for Whites, and a statistically signiﬁcant decrease in inequality for Africans and for Indians.
Inequality measures inferred from per capita household income data based on expenditure
data, report statistically insigniﬁcant increases for the population as a whole, for Coloureds
(though on the Gini measure the increase is marginally signiﬁcant), and for Whites, regardless
of the use of the Gini or Theil measure. For Africans, both inequality measures report noChallenging Cassandra 15
alternation in inequality. Finally, for Indians the Gini coeﬃcient records an increase in
inequality, the Theil a decrease, though both changes remain insigniﬁcant.
The general ﬁnding of inequality changes based on expendiutre data therefore suggests
that inequality in the South African population as a whole, as well as within racial groupings,
has remained largely unchanged over the 1995 - 2000 period, in strong contrast to the
implications that emerge from self-reported income.
Two immediate implications ﬂow from these ﬁndings. First, the results reported in
the present study raise questions about the results reported in Hoogeveen and Özler (2003),
which are based on real per capita expenditure ﬁgures from the 95/00 data set pairing. They
report an increase in the Gini and Theil measures for Africans from 0.47 to 0.50 and 0.41 to
0.46 respectively (as well as an increase in the Gini and Theil measures for the population as a
whole).23 G i v e nt h a tt h eA f r i c a np o p u l a t i o ng r o u p i n gi nS o u t hA f r i c ai sa l s ot h er a c i a lg r o u p
which contains households least able to correct nominal earnings for inﬂationary pressure,
one explanation of this divergence of ﬁndings is that the Gini computed by Hoogeveen and
Özler (2003) suﬀers from the upward bias due to an inappropriate deﬂation of the poorest
income classes noted in the data section above. An alternative interpretation is that while
for income data deﬂation is not appropriate (for the reasons outlined in the data section),
for expenditure data a homogenous price deﬂator may be more appropriate across income
groups. This would render the Hoogeveen and Özler (2003) results appropriate, and would
provide results consistent with the income data of the present study.
Second, the ﬁndings point to a problem of interpretation of the results. Given that the
income data consistently point to an increase in inequality in South Africa over the 1995-
2000 period, while the results from the expenditure data indicate little or no change, ﬁnal
conclusions on the direction of change in inequality are less unambiguous than is desirable.
Inference could be either in favour of no change (if expenditure data is preferred), or in favour
of an increase (if the income data is believed). The ﬁndings on inequality therefore conﬁrm
the implication of the exploratory data analysis that inference on inequality in South Africa
is sensitive to the data set employed.
Caveats in interpreting inequality ﬁndings follow immediately.Challenging Cassandra 16
Finally, note that the Theil measure makes it possible to separate overall inequality into
within and between group inequality. Within racial group inequality quantiﬁes the inequality
ignoring diﬀerences in the mean income level across the diﬀerent groups. We are thus able
to uncover whether overall inequality has changed chieﬂy due to changes in mean incomes
earned by diﬀerent racial groups in South Africa or changes in the income distribution within
the diﬀerent racial groups. Table 6 reports the results. Over 1995 to 2000, both within and
between racial group inequality have risen in South Africa. This appears to be mainly due
t oar i s ei nwithin group inequality in the middle income range, which is a reﬂection of
the rise in per capita income inequality within the African and Coloured racial groups (see
the discussion of the following section). Considering the 1996-1999 data, a large increase in
within group inequality again emerges, although we now mainly observe an increase in the
dispersion of income in the bottom and top income range. The fraction of total inequality
that can be explained by between racial group inequality has decreased over all the years
and plays almost no part for inequality in the bottom and top income ranges.
4.2. Intra-distributional changes in inequality
We extend the present analysis to a consideration of changes in the Gini and Theil inequal-
ity measures over sub-samples of the population. We do so for two alternative decompositions
of the population. In the ﬁrst we consider proportions of the population deﬁned by income
range, in the second we refer to population proportions deﬁned by household counts. Thus
in the ﬁrst decomposition we consider inequality in the bottom, middle and top 1
3 of the total
income range found in South Africa, as well as inequality in the bottom 3
4 and top 1
4 of the
income range. In the second decomposition the sub-components of the sample are deﬁned in
terms of numbers of households, such that the 1
3
0s and quartiles apply to proportions of total
households, rather than income ranges. In the discussion which follows, we refer to these
alternative decompositions as the "income range" and "household proportion" decomposi-
tions respectively. The purpose of these decompositions is to determine whether inequality
increased most strongly at low or high income levels. We also apply the decompositions to
racial groups in the population.Challenging Cassandra 17
Full results are reported in Appendix 2 of the paper. Tables 7 and 8 summarize for the
Gini coeﬃcients for total household and per capita household income respectively. Theil
results are symmetrical, and are not explicitly reported, though full results are provided in
Appendix 2.
An u m b e ro fﬁndings emerge from the evidence.
First, ﬁndings are sensitive to the use of household income or per capita household income
data. The two sets of results largely concur only for the total population, and the African
population for the 96/99 data set pairing, and the White population for the 95/00 data sets.
In all other categories changes in inequality diﬀered between the two deﬁnitions of income.
Second, ﬁndings are sensitive to the use of intradistributional decompositions based on
income range, or on proportions of households. In only 35 of 100 intradistributional changes
do the changes in inequality based on income range and household proportion decompositions
concur.
Third, for the 96/99 data sets there is evidence of considerable volatility in the direction
of change in inequality over a relatively short period of time. Given that it is diﬃcult to
understand why such frequent, rapid, and often substantial change (see the detailed results
of Appendix 2) should emerge in income inequality, this may once again be a reﬂection of
the quality of the OHS income data.
Ag e n e r a lp o i n to n c ea g a i nt h e r e f o r ei st h a tc o n clusions on changes in intradistributional
income inequality depend critically on the data set employed, and on how the data is de-
composed for the intradistributional comparisons.
The warning on the quality of the data employed is particularly cogent given the often
implausibly large changes in inequality and levels of inequality that emerge from the use of
some data sets. The data from the 1999 OHS is particularly noticeable in this regard.
In addition to the general implications, a number of additional substantive results also
emerge from the intradistributional evidence.
For the African population inequality generally increases for per capita household income
on the 95/00 data set pairing. However, important countervailing evidence emerges for the
Bottom 1
3 income range, for which inequality appears to decline, the Top 1
3 income range andChallenging Cassandra 18
household proportion, and the Top 1
4 household proportion, for which inquality is unchanged.
For the 96/99 data set grouping, inequality declines signiﬁcantly for both the Bottom 1
3 and
Bottom 3
4 household proportion on per capita household income, though the income range
decomposition shows the reverse result.
For intradistributional changes in inequality, African total household income results are
distinct from those obtained for per capita income. Perhaps most notable of these is that the
ﬁnding of a decrease in inequality in the Bottom 1
3 income range and household proportion
is reversed. We ﬁnd that inequality in this range of income and for the poorest households
now increases for total household income.
Results for the African population are thus sensitive to data set grouping, and to the
decomposition of households by income range or household proportion. Nevertheless the
results reported above do provide one suggestive result. At least in terms of the 95/00 data
set pairing, the implication is that the extent of income inequality for Africans in the bottom
1
3 of the income distribution has decreased, while an increase in inequality for Africans has
occurred in the middle 1
3 o ft h ei n c o m er a n g e .O n ep o s s i b l ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h i sr e s u l ti s
that welfare transfers to poor households have been successful to some extent, while the loss
of formal sector employment during the course of the 1990’s together with the concomitant
rise in wage earnings over this period would have served to raise inequality in the middle 1
3
of the income distribution.
However, consideration of the mean incomes of households in the lower income ranges
renders this interpretation unlikely. Mean incomes for total and per capita household income
are reported in Appendix 3 of the paper.24 The declining mean income in the bottom range
over the 95/00 data sets suggests that the more likely explanation of the declining income
inequality at low incomes is simply that inﬂa t i o nh a sp u s h e dl o wi n c o m e su p w a r d ,a n dl e f t
increasingly small numbers of households at the very low incomes falling in the lowest range.
On the other hand, the falling mean incomes for the middle income ranges of the African
population would be consistent with explanations resting on changes in unemployment over
the sample period (predicated on the accuracy of the income data, of course).
On per capita household income the 95/00 data set pairing shows an unambiguous in-Challenging Cassandra 19
crease in inequality for Coloureds across all intra-distributional ranges, regardless of whether
decomposition is by income or by household proportion. This mirrors precisely the result of
Hoogeveen and Özler (2003) for Coloureds. But note that the ﬁnding is not replicated for the
96/99 data set grouping, and for total household income the result is again not replicated.
Instead, in both instances movements in inequality are sensitive to the intradistributional
range considered, and the use of the 95/00 and 96/99 data set groupings. Note in particular
that the use of per capita income data in the 96/99 data sets suggests a decrease in income
inequality in all intradistributional ranges (except the Top 1
4 of households), provided only
that the household proportion decomposition is employed.
Our general ﬁnding on the sensitivity of ﬁndings to data set and decomposition noted
above is thus well illustrated by the Coloured population group.
The Indian and White populations show the greatest degree of sensitivity of results to
data set grouping and decomposition, out of all South African racial groups. Given the
results that are to follow for Pareto’s α, it is worth noting that on the 95/00 data sets
income inequality for the Top 1
4 and 1
3 income range and household proportions declined
consistently for total household income for both Indians and Whites, and on the Top 1
4 and
1
3 household proportions for per capita household income. Similar evidence does emerge for
the 96/99 data sets, though the decline in inequality tends to be restricted to the Top 1
4 and
Top 1
3 income ranges, and is not as unambiguous across both racial groups.
W h i l ei ti sn o tp o s s i b l et ov e r i f yt h i sﬁnding, the implication is that there is at least some
evidence consistent with redistribution away from the highest income groups over the 1995
- 2000 time period.
Finally, for the population in aggregate inequality appears to have increased in the Top
1
4 and 1
3 income ranges and household proportions, decreased in the Middle 1
3 and Bottom
3
4 ranges, and increased in the Bottom 1
3 ranges. However, the evidence is only relatively
uncontestable for the Top 1
4 and 1
3 ranges, and elsewhere evidence is mixed depending on
the the use of household or income decompositions, and the data sets employed.Challenging Cassandra 20
4.3. Estimates of Pareto’s α
The ﬁnal set of results in this paper are obtained from an estimation of Pareto’s α,f o r
both total household income and per capita household income.
Recall that Pareto’s α is held to apply only to the upper tail of the income distribution.
Our interest in this part of the income distribution arises from the extreme nature of South
African income inequality. High income levels are particularly far removed from lower income
levels - that much is common cause amongst researchers on income inequality in South Africa.
If so, then any policy designed at redistributing income from upper income classes to lower
income brackets as a means of improving social welfare must be concerned with whether
the redistribution measures are having an impact. One means of assessing whether this
is the case is to examine the distribution of income in the upper tail of income. Where
redistribution is being successful, one possible expectation might be that upper incomes are
coming to be less unequally distributed.25 Pareto’s α is suited to the examination of this
task.
Since the upper tail of the income distribution is dominated by Indians and Whites in
South Africa, we do not believe a racial break-down of the α parameter to add substantially
to the analysis. We therefore report the α-parameter only for the population in aggregate.
Tables 9 and 10 report the results we obtain for the 1995 - 2000 sample period, for total
household income and per capita household income respectively. Readers should recall that
estimation of Pareto’s α requires the speciﬁcation of some lower bound to income, x0,a b o v e
which Pareto’s law is said to hold. It is clear that this introduces an ad hoc element to
the analysis. However, since Pareto’s law hypothesizes a log linear relationship between
cumulative income units and level of income (see the extended discussion of section 2.3
above), as long as the choice of x0 errs on the “high” side, the estimate of α should prove to
be relatively insensitive to the choice of x0. We provide some sense of the sensitivity of b α to
alternative choices of x0, by reporting estimates based on both a “low” and a “high” lower
b o u n di ni n c o m e .
In addition, in order to avoid rendering estimated α’s for successive years arbitrary, we
increased the lower bound income by approximately 10% per year, in order to account forChallenging Cassandra 21
inﬂation in nominal magnitudes.
It is worth noting immediately that the implications derived below are not sensitive to the
choice between the two lower bounds, in the sense that the trend in the inequality measure
remains unaﬀected. For this reason we restrict ourselves to an explicit discussion of the
results derived for the higher of the two lower bound values.
Results diﬀer between the 95/00 and 96/99 data sets, and there is also some diﬀerence
between the results from per capita household income and total household income.
On the 95/00 data sets based on the IES data, the implication is of a rising absolute
value of α, and hence a falling level of inequality. Moreover, this ﬁnding is invariant between
the per capita household income measure, and the total household income measure. By
contrast, the trend in the absolute value of α in the 96/99 grouping of data sets is negative
for the per capita household income variable, implying an increasing level of inequality in
high income households, while it is diﬃcult to discern any trend in the value of α in total
household income for the 96/99 data set grouping.
To check whether the quality of our results was aﬀected by a choice of too low a x0
lower bound value, we reestimated α on income with a lower bound close to three times the
level employed for the results reported above. Results for per capita household income are
reported in Table 11. However, the pattern already reported above, viz. declining inequality
over the 95/00 data set, and rising inequality over the 96/99 data set is repeated.
One possible response to the countervailing evidence is to dismiss the income data from
the OHS surveys as too unreliable - particularly for high income categories, and to focus on
the data based on the IES’s of 95/00 instead. In this case the evidence points clearly to a
reduction in inequality from Pareto’s α - irrespective of whether we employ total household
income or per capita household income. On this interpretation policy makers might conclude
that redistributive policies have had some purchase on upper income levels in South Africa.
Given the countervailing evidence from the OHS data, the suggestion must remain a
hypothesis, and more detailed work is required to settle the matter.Challenging Cassandra 22
5. Conclusions and Evaluation
We have a mixed bag of results here. But that is also the point.
The most immediate lesson to be learnt from the evidence must be that interpretation of
inequality results for South Africa based on household survey data must be undertaken with
considerable care. Results are sensitive both to the choice of real or nominal variables, as
well as the welfare measure chosen. Results from income data and expenditure data provide
substantially diﬀerent results.
At the very least therefore, public policy conclusions should not attach too great a weight
to one measure, or a single data set grouping. Results for this study cast doubt on suggestions
that inequality in South Africa has unambiguously increased.
On income data, our ﬁndings are that inequality measures increased over the 1995 -
2000 time period, regardless of the data set grouping employed, and irrespective of race.
The strongest increase in income inequality occurred for the poorest racial groups in South
Africa, viz. Africans and Coloureds.
Moreover, the strongest increase in income inequality occurs over the middle 1
3 of the
total income range, particularly for Africans, though also for Coloureds. By contrast, there
is arguably a reduction in income inequality in the lowest income range (bottom 1
3)f o r
Africans - though the decrease is marginal, as well as contestable.
Finally, from Pareto’s α measure of inequality there is a weak suggestion that inequality
over high income classes has declined, though this conclusion is sensitive to the data sets
employed.
Such movements in inequality suggest at least three questions for future research.
Is the reduction of the inequality for Africans in the bottom 1
3 of the income distribution
a result of the introduction of welfare payments during the course of the 1990’s?
Is the widening inequality for Africans in the middle 1
3 of the income distribution a
reﬂection of the poorly functioning South African labour market? In particular, to what
extent is it being driven by the loss of formal sector job opportunities at a time when formal
sector pay has been rising particularly for unskilled workers?Challenging Cassandra 23
Finally, is the evidence from Pareto’s α p l a u s i b l e ,a n di fs od o e si ti n d i c a t et h a tp o l i c y
in South Africa during the course of the 1990’s has been successful in redistributing income
from high income households?
At least conceivably, the evidence from the income data of this study suggests that policy
intervention has been successful at improving the lot of the poorest in society through welfare
transfers, and that it has reigned in to some extent excesses at the top of the income pyramid.
In the mid-range of the income distribution, however, inequality appears to have got worse.
Why this is the case must remain the topic of additional research.
Results from expenditure data are less dramatic than for income data. The central ﬁnding
is that there have been no statistically signiﬁcant changes in inequality for the population in
aggregate, and inequality for Africans if anything decreases rather than increases as suggested
b yt h ei n c o m ed a t a .
Further research would also be useful on the relative quality of the income and expenditure
data contained in the survey data employed for this study. Are the divergent results obtained
for income and expenditure a function of data collection problems? If so, are the problems
more severe for expenditure or for income? The answer matters for policy contexts, since
the inferences drawn on the magnitude of change in inequality and the racial concentration
of such changes is markedly diﬀerent.
Another possibility is that the role of real and nominal data diﬀers between income and
expenditure data. We saw in the data section of the paper that the use of real income
data deﬂated on average price indexes would be likely to overstate the extent of inequality.
Whether this inference follows to the same degree for expenditure data is perhaps also worthy
of further investigation, since results from the Hoogeveen and Özler (2003) study suggest
that results consistent with those obtained on the income data for this study are feasible.
But one feature of the results in this study remains incontrovertible. Regardless of which
inequality measure we employ, and which data set is considered, South African inequality
remains high in absolute terms. Much therefore remains to be done to reduce it.Challenging Cassandra 24
Notes
1See for instance Deaton (1997: 139-40ﬀ) for a fuller treatment.
2Three additional criteria mentioned by Dalton are termed the principle of proportionate additions to
income,t h eprinciple of equal additions to incomes,a n dt h eprinciple of proportionate additions to persons.
3This is equal to the arithmetic mean of deviations from the median, weighted by the number of incomes
intermediate between the median and the income whose deviation is being calculated, plus one.
4See Pareto (1896, 1897).
5Dalton (1920) notes that the Gini coeﬃcient can be inferred from the Pareto inequality measure. Gini
notes that many income distributions approximate an expression that is close to Pareto’s, viz. N = 1
csδ,
where s denotes the total income of the N richest income receivers, with c,δ constant parameters. Since
δ = α
α−1, this is analogous to Pareto’s law. By means of a transformation into a Lorenz curve, Dalton’s
analysis shows that the Gini coeﬃcient can now be derived as G = δ−1
δ+1 = 1
2α−1.
6See Allen (1956: 407-8).
7For an extended review of the literature surrounding Pareto’s law, and an engaging discussion of its
“sociological” interpretation, in particular the possibility of attributing the constancy of α to either chance,
social institutions or human nature, see Persky (1992). See also Davis (1963) on the link of α to social
instability.
8Speciﬁcally for Un =
Pn
i=1 ui,w h e r eui denotes the n independent random variables with common
distribution, either ui or Un, but not necessarily n is large.
9See Lévy (1925, 1937) and also Feller (1966: ch6).
10A random variable composed of a sum of independent variables is said to have a stable distribution if
the sum has the same distribution as its constituent elements up to some linear transformation.
11Note that Simon (1955) is concerned with the frequency with which words appear in texts, and Steindl
(1965) with ﬁrm characteristics. Their approaches generalize to income.
12See for instance Persons (1909).
13See for instance Johnson (1937).
14Since households have diﬀerent probabilities of being selected in samples, some households may come to
be overrepresented, others underrepresented. Correction was by the weights supplied by StatsSA.
15See the discussion and Deaton and Zaidi (2002), Hoogeveen and Özler (2003), and Ravaillon (2001).
16As a consequence Hoogeveen and Özler (2003) use the expenditure data in their analysis. They do not
extend their analysis to income data.
17T h e s ea r et h ed e ﬂators employed by Hoogeveen and Özler (2003) in their South African study.
18The diﬀerence in sample size between the total household income and the per capita household income
data arises due to missing values in the StatsSA household size variable.Challenging Cassandra 25
19The conventional bias arises due to a presumption that survey respondents are reluctant to disclose
income directly. In the South African surveys, in the IES surveys income was adjusted on the basis of
rendered expenditure information.
20For a discussion of the choice of these poverty lines see Hoogeveen and Özler (2003).
21We computed per capita income by simply dividing by household size. Using adult equivalence and
adjusting for economies of scale in larger households, would likely adjust the per capita income of poorer and
larger households upwards. The aggregate income inequality measured in this paper can thus be considered
an upper bound to the true (lower) value. The bias in the inequality measure within population groups may
be more ambiguous.
22This ﬁnding would be consistent with traditionally sheltered economic conditions for the sections of the
white population most vulnerable to economic competition disappearing, leading to a loss of income.
23See Table 5 of the paper.
24Note that the data on mean income on intradistributional ranges further conﬁrms our earlier doubts
expressed about the reliability of income data from South African OHS’s.
25Of course, strictly this depends on whether it is the upper or the lower portion of the "rich" income
group being subject to the change.
References
Allen, R.G.D., 1956, Mathematical Analysis for Economists, London: Macmillan.
Clark, C., 1951, The Conditions of Economic Progress,2 ’ n de d . ,L o n d o n :M a c m i l l a n .
Champernowne, D.G., 1953, A Model of Income Distribution, Economic Journal, 63, 318-51.
Cramer, J.S., 1969, Empirical Econometrics, Amsterdam & London: North - Holland.
Dalton, H., 1920, The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes, Economic Journal,3 0 ,
199, 348-61.
Davis, H., 1963, The Analysis of Economic Time Series, San Antonio: Principia Press.
Deaton, A., 1997, The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach to
Development Policy, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press.
Deaton, A., and Zaidi, S., 2002, Guidelines for Constructing Consumption Aggregates for
Welfare Analysis, LSMS Working Paper No. 135, Washington DC: World Bank.Challenging Cassandra 26
Feller, W., 1966, An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications,N e wY o r k :
Wiley.
Gini, C., Variabilitià e Multabilità,
Hoogeven, J.G., and Özler, B., 2003, Not Separate, Not Equal: Poverty and Inequality in
Post-Apartheid South Africa, Washington DC: World Bank.
Johnson, N., 1937, The Pareto Law, Review of Economic Statistics, 19, 20-6.
Lévy, P., 1925, Calcul des Probabilités, Paris: Gauthier-Villars.
Lévy, P., 1937, Théorie de l’Addition des Variables Aléatoires, Paris: Gauthier-Villars.
Mandelbrot, B., 1960, The Pareto-Lévy law and the distribution of income, International
Economic Review,1 ,7 9 - 1 0 6 .
Mandelbrot, B., 1961, Stable Paretian random functions and the multiplicative variation of
income, Econometrica, 29, 517-43.
Pareto, V., 1896, La Courbe de la Repartition de la Richesse, in G. Busino (ed.), Oevres
completes de Vilfredo Pareto, 3, 1.15 Ecrits sur la Corbe de la Repartition de la Richesse,
Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1965.
Pareto, V., 1897, Cours D’Economie Politique, in G.H. Bourquet and G. Busino (eds.),
Oevres completes de Vilfredo Pareto, 1, Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1964.
Persky, J., 1992, Pareto’s Law, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(2), 181-92.
Persons, W., 1909, The Variability in the Distribution of Wealth and Income, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 23, 416-49.
Pigou, A.C., 1912, Wealth and Welfare, London: Macmillan.
Ravaillon, M., 2001, Poverty Lines: Economic Foundations of Current Practices. Washington
DC: World Bank.
Simon, H.A., 1955, On a class of skew distribution functions, Biometrika, 42, 425-40.Challenging Cassandra 27
StatsSA, 1998, Living in South Africa, Selected ﬁndings of the 1995 October household survey.
Steindl, J., 1965, Random Processes and the Growth of Firms, London: Griﬃn.
6. Appendix 1: Data Sets, Data Problems and Relevant Data Transformations
Income and expenditure data for this study is collected from a range of Income and
Expenditure Surveys (IES), October Household Surveys (OHS) and the new Labour Force
Survey (LFS). The data appendix provides brief notes on the data compilation issues that
arise from each data set.
Readers should note that personal income information is composed of data that is both
continuous, since it contains the actual income (or expenditure) amount tendered by respon-
dents, and/or discrete since it also contains an indication of an income bracket in which work
and non-work income falls.
6.1. OHS 1995
The OHS 1995 questionnaire asked for the actual income amount or income bracket
before deductions. Additionally, workers were asked to indicate the estimated value they
receive in kind per week (transport, food, other).
Problems in the data arise on own account income as the income bracket and frequency
data does not correspond to the coding in the questionnaire. Most researchers seem to
circumvent these problems by using the IES data in the ﬁrst place. Stats SA in their
summary of ﬁndings on the OHS also quotes IES ﬁndings in their discussion of incomes. We
have been forced to resort to the IES data also.26
6.2. IES 1995
The Income and Expenditure survey (IES 1995) collected detailed information on income
and expenditure patterns mostly in the same households as those who were included in the
OHS sample.Challenging Cassandra 28
6.3. OHS 1996
Income before deductions of employees was recorded in 14 income brackets. Income
before any expenditures (i.e. turnover) of self-employed persons was recorded in 16 income
brackets. For expenditures on goods, wages and other of self-employed the actual amount
was asked for. For income of the self-employed, we therefore obtain a continuous variable if
we subtract expenditures from the midpoint of income brackets.
Household income from sources other than employment and self-employment has been
collected in a separate section of the survey (section 7). Respondents were asked to either
indicate an annual or monthly amount received from various sources, including ﬁnancial
support from non-members of the household.
Total household income can therefore be summated as the incomes earned by working
household members plus the sum of non-work income reported in section 7.
In order to create a variable for total household income, we calculated household income
from work and added other income to form total household income.
6.4. OHS 1997
For each household member, the actual amount they received from various non-work
sources was asked. Sources also include support from relatives or other persons outside the
household.
The personal income question similarly asks for the actual amount received, for the
period of payment and in which of 14 income brackets receipts fell. Information on the
income bracket was elicited in the case of refusal to answer the income questions, or in the
event of a don’t know response with regard to the actual income ﬁgure.
Income of self-employed persons can be calculated from a variable given as total turnover
before the deduction of expenses, less expenditure on goods, remuneration and other costs.
Again refusals and don’t know responses on pre c i s ei n c o m ec o u l di n d i c a t et h e i ri n c o m e/
turnover bracket. Information on expenses would still be given as an actual amount (Q.
3.27). One problem with regard to self-employed income is that subtracting expenditures
from the midpoint of an income bracket could lead to negative income ﬁgures.Challenging Cassandra 29
6.5. OHS 1998
Income information was collected in the same way as in the OHS 1997. For each household
member, the actual amount they are receiving from each non-work source is asked. This
section is identical to the questionnaire in 1997.
Again as in 1997, the personal income question asks for the actual amount, for the period
of payment and in which of 14 income brackets the amount fell.
In deriving self-employed income variables, the problem of arriving at negative income
ﬁgures for self-employed is more prevalent than in the 1997 data set.
6.6. OHS 1999
This data set appears to be the most problematic in terms of survey design regarding
income information. As in 1997 and 1998, respondents in the worker section were asked to
indicate their actual income amount from work before deductions, but could also indicate
into which of 14 income brackets the amount fell.
A ﬁrst problem arises from the fact that for self-employed, their income (actual amount
or income bracket, same brackets as for employees) is recorded before deducting expenses,
but the questions on actual expenses on material, wages etc. have been skipped. This makes
income information for self-employed incomparable to that of self-employed in previous OHS
surveys.
Further, non-wage income of household members was not recorded separately any longer.
Instead, it is indicated whether somebody receives income from a certain source or not, and
a person’s total income from work and non-work sources is then only recorded within an
income bracket (Q. 4.13). There are 9 income brackets which means that there is a further
loss of information if we use this variable as income variable in comparison to the wage
information.
Asking income information in several sections of the interview may have enhanced the
quality of the income variable if interviewers cross-checked during the interview and prompted
respondents to conﬁrm their answer or correct if an amount deviated from an earlier state-
m e n t . S u c hap o s s i b l eg a i ni sl i k e l yt oh a v eb e e ne r o d e db yt h eb r o a db r a c k e t si nw h i c hChallenging Cassandra 30
personal total income and household total income have been recorded.
There also is a total household income variable in Section 6 (House). This aﬀords the
opportunity to cross-check the total household income variable calculated from the person
level data on work and non work income.
6.7. IES 2000 and LFS September 2000
Income from work for someone else or own account is asked as the amount including
overtime, allowances and bonus, before any tax or deductions (Q. 4.15). As in the OHS,
respondents refusing to disclose the actual amount or not knowing it, could indicate one of 14
income brackets. The LFS has no information on the amount of non-work income received
by household members or the household, as the questionnaire is only recording whether
someone is receiving income from a particular source or not (or doesn’t know, Section 6 of
LFS questionnaire).
In the IES 2000, respondents are stating their regular income from work, other non-work
income and the data set then generates variables for total income and undeclared income.
Where income data was missing but expenditure data existed StatsSA estimated the
expenditure amount to be “undeclared income.” In case total income proved signiﬁcantly
smaller than total expenditure, undeclared income was estimated equal to the total expen-
diture minus the total income.
7. Appendix 2: Intradistributional changes in income inequality
INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT TABLE 18 ABOUT HERE.
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8. Appendix 3: Mean Incomes
INSERT TABLE 20 ABOUT HERE.
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Year N Mean Median Mode Std.Dev. Variance Skewness Kurtosis
1995 29595 1678 1494 410 1.10 1.21 0.40 2.82
1996 16269 869 1250 2000 1.66 2.76 -0.52 2.65
1997 29811 1059 1000 470 1.23 1.52 -0.10 3.46
1998 18981 1080 1031 500 1.30 1.70 -0.12 3.66
1999 26308 1256 1000 600 1.19 1.42 0.39 3.05
2000 26265 1360 1200 540 1.16 1.35 0.19 3.69
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Aggregate Household Income. Income ﬁgures are current,
and denote monthly income.
Year N Mean Median Mode Std.Dev. Variance Skewness Kurtosis
1995 28585 455 406 410 1.25 1.55 0.36 2.71
1996 11824 220 275 1000 1.77 3.13 -0.46 2.72
1997 27559 268 250 100 1.34 1.80 0.03 3.20
1998 16170 304 300 500 1.42 2.02 -0.07 3.34
1999 24114 392 343 200 1.34 1.79 0.28 2.96
2000 26265 437 397 500 1.29 1.67 0.21 3.07
Table 2: Summary statistics for per capita income. Income ﬁgures are in current Rand, and
denote monthly income.Challenging Cassandra 33
Year Low Poverty Mid Poverty High Poverty
Line Line Line
Income < 52.77 105.54 195.30
1995 Total 2.05 11.78 27.90
African 1.97 11.02 25.08
Coloured 0.08 0.75 2.71
Indian 0.00 0.00 0.03
White 0.00 0.02 0.07
Income < 58.32 116.64 215.84
1996 Total 15.91 23.37 32.91
African 14.48 21.07 28.92
Coloured 0.80 1.36 2.66
Indian 0.15 0.22 0.40
White 0.48 0.72 0.95
Income < 64.45 128.90 238.54
1997 Total 12.05 28.00 44.85
African 11.27 25.81 40.06
Coloured 0.57 1.70 3.79
Indian 0.04 0.13 0.27
White 0.17 0.35 0.72
Income < 71.23 142.46 263.63
1998 Total 12.29 25.75 40.35
African 11.63 23.80 35.81
Coloured 0.45 1.43 3.41
Indian 0.09 0.19 0.31
White 0.13 0.33 0.82
Income < 78.72 157.44 291.36
1999 Total 10.43 24.40 39.32
African 10.04 23.10 36.25
Coloured 0.35 1.20 2.78
Indian 0.01 0.04 0.14
White 0.03 0.07 0.15
Income < 87 174 322
2000 Total 8.83 24.68 44.07
African 8.50 23.34 40.60
Coloured 0.26 1.20 3.19
Indian 0.02 0.05 0.13
White 0.04 0.08 0.16
Table 3: Percentage of the Population with income below indicated values.Challenging Cassandra 34
Gini Total Household Income
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Income Expend. Income Income Income Income Income Expend.
Total 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.59
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
African 0.52 0.53 0.61 0.55 0.59 0.61 0.54 0.50
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Coloured 0.45 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.60 0.66 0.50 0.48
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Indian 0.46 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.54 0.42 0.45 0.43
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
White 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.51 0.50 0.40 0.43 0.43
(0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Theil Total Household Income
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Income Expend. Income Income Income Income Income Expend.
Total 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.90 1.13 0.76 0.72
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.11) (0.02) (0.03)
African 0.54 0.56 0.68 0.55 0.74 1.04 0.59 0.49
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.02)
Coloured 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.44 1.12 1.69 0.45 0.41
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.43) (0.41) (0.02) (0.02)
Indian 0.42 0.37 0.39 0.44 0.64 0.31 0.35 0.30
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
White 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.47 0.47 0.37 0.34 0.39
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
Table 4: Gini and Theil for Aggregate Population for Total Household Income.Challenging Cassandra 35
Gini Per Capita Household Income
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Income Expend. Income Income Income Income Income Expend.
Total 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.67
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.01)
African 0.56 0.57 0.65 0.59 0.64 0.68 0.61 0.57
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Coloured 0.49 0.50 0.56 0.51 0.62 0.72 0.55 0.52
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Indian 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.57 0.47 0.49 0.47
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
White 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.45 0.46 0.46
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Theil Per Capita Household Income
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Income Expend. Income Income Income Income Income Expend.
Total 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.98 1.11 1.48 1.00 0.98
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.13) (0.03) (0.03)
African 0.66 0.67 0.80 0.68 0.95 1.46 0.76 0.67
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.22) (0.04) (0.02)
Coloured 0.45 0.48 0.56 0.51 1.09 2.14 0.56 0.50
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.35) (0.47) (0.04) (0.03)
Indian 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.53 0.92 0.40 0.44 0.41
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.36) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
White 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.40 0.44
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.04)
Table 5: Gini and Theil for Aggregate Population for Per Capita Household Income.






Inequality Income Expend Income Income Income
decomposed Range Range Range
by pop. grps. With. Betw. With. Betw. With. Betw. With. Betw. With. Betw.
1995 0.51 0.40 0.51 0.41 0.10 0.002 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.001
1996 0.58 0.31 0.06 0.001 0.30 0.01 0.25 0.07
1997 0.58 0.40 0.11 0.001 0.39 0.12 0.21 0.01
1998 0.80 0.31 0.13 0.001 0.42 0.14 0.37 0.01
1999 1.17 0.31 0.18 0.005 0.29 0.10 0.62 0.11
2000 0.58 0.42 0.55 0.43 0.08 0.002 0.39 0.10 0.19 0.007
Table 6: Theil’s Within and Between Inequality MeasureChallenging Cassandra 36












Total ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓Y,↑N
African ↑ −→ Y,↑N ↓Y,↑N ↓Y,↑N ↓Y,↑N
Coloured −→ Y,↑N ↓ ↑ −→ ↑
Indian ↓Y,↑N ↓Y,−→ N ↑Y,↓N ↓Y,↑N ↓
White −→ Y,↑N ↓Y,↑N ↑Y,↓N ↓Y,↑N ↓
96/99
Total ↑Y,↓N ↑↓Y,↓N ↓↑Y,↑N ↑Y,↓N ↑
African ↑Y,↓N ↑↓Y,↓N ↓↑Y,↑N ↑Y,↓N −→ Y,↑N
Coloured ↑↓↑Y,↓N ↑↓Y,↓↑N ↓↑Y,↑N ↑Y,↓N ↓↑Y,↑N
Indian ↑Y,↓N ↑↓Y,↑N ↓ ↑ −→
White ↑↓Y,↓N ↓Y,↑↓N ↓Y,↑N ↑↓Y,↓N −→ Y,↑N
↑,↓ denote statistically signiﬁcant increases and decreases in inequality respectively.
−→ denotes no statistically signiﬁcant change in inequality.
Y,N denote changes associated with the income range and
household decomposition respectively.
Table 7: Gini coeﬃcient for intradistributional changes in total household income












Total ↓Y,↑N ↑Y,↓N ↑ −→ ↑
African ↓Y,↑N ↑ −→ ↑ ↑Y,−→ N
Coloured ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Indian −→ Y,↑N ↓Y,↑N ↑Y,↓N −→ Y,↑N −→ Y,↓N
White −→ Y,↑N ↓Y,−→ N ↑Y,↓N ↓Y,↑N −→
96/99
Total ↑Y,↓N ↑Y,↓N ↓↑Y,↑N ↑Y,↓N ↑
African ↑Y,↓N ↑↓Y,↓N ↓↑Y,↑N ↑Y,↓N ↑
Coloured ↑↓↑Y,↓N ↑Y,↓N ↓↑↓Y,↑N ↑Y,↓N ↑
Indian −→ Y,↑↓N ↑ −→ ↑ −→
White ↓ ↓ ↓−→Y,↑N ↑Y,↓N −→ Y,↑N
↑,↓ denote statistically signiﬁcant increases and decreases in inequality respectively.
−→ denotes no statistically signiﬁcant change in inequality.
Y,N denote changes associated with the income range and
household decomposition respectively.
Table 8: Gini coeﬃcient for intradistributional changes in per capita household incomeChallenging Cassandra 37
Year x0
high αhigh δhigh Ginihigh x0
low αlow δlow Ginilow
1995 1097 -1.17 6.88 0.75 992 -1.14 8.14 0.78
1996 1212 -1.32 4.13 0.61 1097 -1.30 4.33 0.63
1997 1339 -1.42 3.38 0.54 1212 -1.37 3.70 0.57
1998 1480 -1.34 3.94 0.60 1339 -1.32 4.13 0.61
1999 1635 -1.37 3.70 0.57 1480 -1.24 5.17 0.68
2000 1808 -1.34 3.94 0.60 1635 -1.31 4.23 0.62
Table 9: Pareto’s alpha on aggregate household income, with implied Gini.
Year x0
high αhigh δhigh Ginihigh x0
low αlow δlow Ginilow
1995 1097 -1.53 2.89 0.49 992 -1.48 3.08 0.51
1996 1212 -1.87 2.15 0.36 1097 -1.83 2.20 0.38
1997 1339 -1.78 2.28 0.39 1212 -1.74 2.35 0.40
1998 1480 -1.64 2.56 0.43 1339 -1.62 2.61 0.45
1999 1635 -1.69 2.45 0.42 1480 -1.65 2.54 0.43
2000 1808 -1.74 2.35 0.40 1635 -1.70 2.43 0.42
Table 10: Pareto’s alpha on per capita household income, with implied Gini.
Year x0 α δ Gini
1995 2981 -1.83 2.20 0.38
1996 3294 -2.55 1.65 0.24
1997 3641 -1.96 2.04 0.34
1998 4024 -1.75 2.33 0.40
1999 4447 -1.73 2.37 0.41
2000 4915 -2.07 1.93 0.32
Table 11: Pareto’s alpha on per capita household income, for high income values, with
implied Gini.Challenging Cassandra 38
Income Range Decomposition Household Proportion Decomposition
Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4 Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4
1995 Total 0.17 0.45 0.31 0.56 0.28 0.19 0.18 0.39 0.36 0.36
(0.002) (0.003) (0.02) (0.004) (0.02) (0.002) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
African 0.17 0.41 0.36 0.51 0.31 0.16 0.13 0.36 0.29 0.34
(0.002) (0.005) (0.06) (0.006) (0.05) (0.002) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
Coloured 0.15 0.39 0.19 0.45 0.04 0.17 0.15 0.28 0.29 0.26
(0.004) (0.007) (0.05) (0.009) (0.03) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Indian 0.10 0.36 0.25 0.42 0.19 0.2 0.12 0.33 0.28 0.32
(0.01) (0.009) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.004) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
White 0.17 0.32 0.30 0.38 0.27 0.24 0.12 0.31 0.27 0.3
(0.02) (0.005) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.002) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
1996 Total 0.06 0.38 0.39 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.36 0.49 0.32
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
African 0.05 0.39 0.33 0.52 0.24 0.46 0.21 0.34 0.5 0.31
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Coloured 0.09 0.31 0.33 0.38 22 0.35 0.17 0.26 0.38 0.22
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Indian 0.02 0.26 0.40 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.11 0.30 0.3 0.27
(0.005) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
White 0.11 0.45 0.36 0.38 0.30 0.4 0.13 0.24 0.34 0.21
(0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1997 Total 0.27 0.43 0.33 0.53 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.42 0.38 0.38
(0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) 0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) 0.38
African 0.26 0.43 0.24 0.52 0.21 0.26 0.17 0.35 0.35 0.32
(0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.004) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
Coloured 0.29 0.36 0.20 0.44 0.13 0.25 0.15 0.29 0.33 0.26
(0.08) (0.006) (0.01) (0.007) (0.02) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Indian 0.13 0.31 0.32 0.38 0.29 0.29 0.12 0.31 0.32 0.30
(0.08) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
White 0.40 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.37 0.14 0.33 0.35 0.31
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 12: Intradistributional income inequality: Gini Coeﬃcient on Total Household Income,
1995-97. Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors.Challenging Cassandra 39
Income Range Decomposition Household Proportion Decomposition
Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4 Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4
1998 Total 0.25 0.50 0.37 0.58 0.35 0.26 0.19 0.45 0.4 0.42
(0.01) (0.003) (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.002) (0.02) (0.003) (0.02)
African 0.25 0.49 0.35 0.55 0.26 0.29 0.18 0.41 0.36 0.39
(0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.004) (0.03) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01)
Coloured 0.14 0.40 0.54 0.47 0.56 0.24 0.17 0.48 0.34 0.48
(0.05) (0.007) (0.15) (0.010) (0.16) (0.01) (0.004) (0.11) (0.01) (0.12)
Indian 0.14 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.27 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.37 0.36
(0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.14) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
White 0.23 0.34 0.31 0.42 0.27 0.34 0.15 0.32 0.35 0.30
(0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.004) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
1999 Total 0.43 0.27 0.49 0.61 0.39 0.23 0.17 0.47 0.36 0.43
(0.002) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.003) (0.002) (0.02) (0.002) (0.02)
African 0.43 0.26 0.42 0.57 0.30 0.25 0.17 0.48 0.31 0.45
(0.003) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.002) (0.002) (0.03) (0.002) (0.03)
Coloured 0.35 0.24 0.42 0.50 0.40 0.21 0.18 0.55 0.35 0.55
(0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.08)
Indian 0.28 0.25 xx 0.42 xx 0.26 0.14 0.2 0.34 0.2
(0.02) (0.02) - (0.02) - (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
White 0.24 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.30 0.24 0.1 0.29 0.27 0.32
(0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
2000 Total 0.28 0.41 0.33 0.54 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.44 0.34 0.41
(0.03) (0.002) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
African 0.28 0.41 0.28 0.50 0.26 0.2 0.14 0.39 0.3 0.36
(0.03) (0.002) (0.02) (0.004) (0.07) (0.004) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
Coloured 0.12 0.33 0.27 0.45 0.14 0.21 0.14 0.35 0.3 0.32
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Indian 0.00 0.28 0.29 0.37 0.15 0.25 0.13 0.26 0.32 0.23
(0) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
White 0.11 0.27 0.33 0.31 0.23 0.27 0.13 0.25 0.31 0.24
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.003) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Table 13: Intradistributional income inequality: Gini Coeﬃcient on Total Household Income,
1998-2000. xx denotes missing values. Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors.Challenging Cassandra 40
Income Range Decomposition Household Proportion Decomposition
Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4 Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4
1995 Total 0.25 0.48 0.29 0.64 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.41 0.43 0.38
(0.002) (0.003) (0.02) (0.004) (0.03) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
African 0.25 0.40 0.29 0.55 0.08 0.21 0.15 0.38 0.35 0.35
0.003) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
Coloured 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.49 0.00 0.20 0.13 0.32 0.31 0.29
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Indian 0.11 0.40 0.17 0.46 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.33 0.28 0.32
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.004) (0.03) (0.01) (0.44)
White 0.17 0.34 0.29 0.39 0.24 0.21 0.11 0.32 0.27 0.31
(0.03) (.005) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.002) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
1996 Total 0.19 0.44 0.42 0.56 0.29 0.47 0.24 0.39 0.52 0.36
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
African 0.18 0.45 0.33 0.58 0.23 0.47 0.23 0.36 0.52 0.32
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Coloured 0.18 0.33 0.36 0.44 0.24 0.34 0.17 0.33 0.39 0.29
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.005) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Indian 0.00 0.27 0.38 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.13 0.29 0.32 0.26
(0) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
White 0.39 0.44 0.40 0.35 0.31 0.36 0.14 0.26 0.35 0.24
(0.20) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1997 Total 0.26 0.54 0.32 0.64 0.24 0.29 0.19 0.46 0.44 0.43
(0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.004) (0.02) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
African 0.25 0.52 0.23 0.58 0.16 0.27 0.17 0.36 0.40 0.33
(0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.004) (0.03) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
Coloured 0.26 0.45 0.26 0.50 0.33 0.27 0.13 0.32 0.34 0.30
(0.04) (0.006) (0.08) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.006) (0.02)
Indian 0.17 0.37 0.34 0.45 0.32 0.28 0.12 0.34 0.33 0.33
(0.07) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.004) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
White 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.43 0.23 0.33 0.14 0.32 0.36 0.31
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Table 14: Intradistributional income inequality: Gini Coeﬃcient on Per Capita Household
Income, 1995-97. Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors.Challenging Cassandra 41
Income Range Decomposition Household Proportion Decomposition
Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4 Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4
1998 Total 0.28 0.57 0.36 0.66 0.39 0.31 0.20 0.47 0.47 0.43
(0.01) (0.003) (0.03) (0.004) (0.05) (0.004) (0.001) (0.02) (0.003) (0.02)
African 0.28 0.55 0.37 0.62 0.39 0.29 0.20 0.43 0.44 0.41
(0.01) (0.004) (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (0.004) (0.002) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02)
Coloured 0.19 0.46 0.55 0.51 0.45 0.25 0.16 0.49 0.36 0.49
(0.07) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.004) (0.09) (0.01) (0.10)
Indian 0.17 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.62 0.36 0.15 0.41 0.38 0.42
(0.04) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.26) (0.03) (0.005) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10)
White 0.12 0.34 0.32 0.44 0.29 0.31 0.14 0.33 0.35 0.31
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
1999 Total 0.34 0.47 0.58 0.68 0.44 0.29 0.21 0.50 0.47 0.48
(0.003) (0.004) (0.04) (0.004) (0.04) (0.003) (0.001) (0.02) (0.002) (0.03)
African 0.35 0.41 0.61 0.64 0.42 0.27 0.19 0.51 0.43 0.50
(0.003) (0.007) (0.07) (0.01) (0.05) (0.003) (0.001) (0.03) (0.002) (0.04)
Coloured 0.26 0.41 0.42 0.53 0.40 0.26 0.15 0.63 0.36 0.63
(0.009) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.003) (0.08) (0.01) (0.08)
Indian 0.21 0.40 0.00 0.47 xx 0.26 0.16 0.27 0.36 0.27
(0.03) (0.02) (0) (0.02) - (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
White 0.26 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.25 0.12 0.33 0.29 0.33
(0.04) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.003) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
2000 Total 0.21 0.54 0.31 0.64 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.45 0.43 0.41
(0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.004) (0.02) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
African 0.21 0.52 0.26 0.59 0.28 0.25 0.17 0.39 0.39 0.36
(0.01) (0.003) (0.03) (0.004) (0.10) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
Coloured 0.25 0.45 0.24 0.52 0.10 0.23 0.14 0.36 0.33 0.33
(0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Indian 0.13 0.35 0.22 0.46 0.17 0.24 0.14 0.29 0.33 0.25
(0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
White 0.39 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.24 0.28 0.11 0.29 0.31 0.28
(0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.002) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Table 15: Intradistributional income inequality: Gini Coeﬃcient on Per Capita Household
Income, 1998-2000. xx denotes missing values. Figures in round parentheses denote standard
errors.Challenging Cassandra 42
Income Range Decomposition Household Proportion Decomposition
Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4 Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4
1995 Total 0.05 0.34 0.21 0.56 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.32 0.20 0.29
(0.001) (0..005) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.001) (0.001) (0.03) (0.003) (0.03)
African 0.05 0.29 0.27 0.46 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.30 0.13 0.27
(0.001) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.04) (0.002) (0.04)
Coloured 0.03 l0.25 0.07 0.35 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.13 0.13
(0.002) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.003) (0.001) (0.02) (0.004) (0.02)
Indian 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.24 0.13 0.23
(0.004) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.001) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
White 0.05 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.23 0.12 0.22
(0.01) (0.005) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.005) (0.001) (0.03) (0.005) (0.04)
1996 Total 0.02 0.25 0.27 0.42 0.15 0.34 0.07 0.29 0.41 0.24
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
African 0.02 0.25 0.20 0.46 0.11 0.35 0.07 0.24 0.42 0.19
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Coloured 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.08 0.23 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.16
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.002) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Indian 0.001 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.16 0.13
(0.0002) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
White 0.06 0.36 0.22 0.28 0.16 0.30 0.03 0.13 0.21 0.11
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1997 Total 0.12 0.30 0.23 0.48 0.14 0.12 0.05 0.44 0.23 0.38
(0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.001) (0.03) (0.002) (0.02)
African 0.12 0.31 0.12 0.46 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.26 0.19 0.22
(0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
Coloured 0.16 0.20 0.08 0.32 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.24 0.18 0.22
(0.09) (0.006) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001) (0.07) (0.01) (0.08)
Indian 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.02 0.30 0.18 0.29
(0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.002) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09)
White 0.27 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.15 0.22 0.03 0.22 0.22 0.20
(0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Table 16: Intradistributional income inequality: Theil Entropy Measure on Total Household
Income, 1995-97. Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors.Challenging Cassandra 43
Income Range Decomposition Household Proportion Decomposition
Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4 Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4
1998 Total 0.11 0.41 0.38 0.60 0.36 0.13 0.06 0.53 0.26 0.48
(0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.15) (0.004) (0.001) (0.06) (0.004) (0.07)
African 0.11 0.41 0.28 0.55 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.48 0.21 0.45
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.005) (0.001) (0.06) (0.004) (0.07)
Coloured 0.04 0.26 1.00 0.38 0.70 0.10 0.04 0.82 0.19 0.82
(0.02) (0.01) (0.36) (0.02) (0.28) (0.01) (0.002) (0.33) (0.01) (0.34)
Indian 0.03 0.22 0.19 0.34 0.33 0.23 0.04 0.71 0.23 0.73
(0.01) (0.02) (0.22) (0.04) (0.24) (0.03) (0.004) (0.42) (0.02) (0.44)
White 0.10 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.16 0.20 0.03 0.25 0.21 0.23
(0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.002) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
1999 Total 0.30 0.15 0.43 0.73 0.26 0.11 0.05 0.73 0.21 0.68
(0.003) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (0.002) (0.001) (0.11) (0.003) (0.11)
African 0.30 0.14 0.31 0.66 0.16 0.12 0.05 0.77 0.17 0.74
(0.004) (0.01) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.001) (0.001) (0.16) (0.002) (0.16)
Coloured 0.20 0.13 0.33 0.45 0.29 0.09 0.06 1.48 0.20 1.52
(0.01) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.01) (0.004) (0.41) (0.01) (0.40)
Indian 0.14 0.12 xx 0.31 xx 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.09
(0.02) (0.02) - (0.03) - (0.02) (0.004) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
White 0.13 0.14 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.13 0.02 0.26 0.14 0.28
(0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.03) (0.08) (0.01) (0.002) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09)
2000 Total 0.14 0.27 0.22 0.50 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.38 0.18 0.33
(0.02) (0.003) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.002) (0.001) (0.02) (0.002) (0.02)
African 0.14 0.27 0.20 0.45 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.32 0.15 0.29
(0.02) (0.003) (0.06) (0.01) (0.13) (0.003) (0.0005) (0.04) (0.002) (0.04)
Coloured 0.03 0.17 0.13 0.33 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.21 0.14 0.17
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Indian 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.09
(0) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
White 0.03 0.13 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.15
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.001) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Table 17: Intradistributional income inequality: Theil Entropy Measure on Total Household
Income, 1998-2000. xx denotes missing values. Figures in round parentheses denote standard
errors.Challenging Cassandra 44
Income Range Decomposition Household Proportion Decomposition
Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4 Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4
1995 Total 0.10 0.39 0.17 0.79 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.36 0.30 0.31
(0.002) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.002) (0.001) (0.02) (0.004) (0.02)
African 0.10 0.29 0.14 0.59 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.32 0.19 0.29
(0.002) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.002) (0.0005) (0.03) (0.003) (0.03)
Coloured 0.06 0.28 0.05 0.45 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.20 0.15 0.18
(0.004) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0) (0.004) (0.001) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Indian 0.02 0.27 0.05 0.40 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.22 0.13 0.19
(0.006) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
White 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.23 0.12 0.22
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.005) (0.001) (0.03) (0.005) (0.03)
1996 Total 0.06 0.32 0.32 0.53 0.16 0.37 0.09 0.29 0.46 0.24
(0.005) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
African 0.06 0.34 0.21 0.58 0.10 0.36 0.08 0.24 0.46 0.19
(0.005) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Coloured 0.07 0.18 0.24 0.32 0.11 0.22 0.05 0.20 0.26 0.16
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.003) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Indian 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.17 0.13
(0) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.002) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
White 0.37 0.32 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.24 0.03 0.13 0.22 0.11
(0.21) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1997 Total 0.11 0.50 0.21 0.77 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.44 0.31 0.38
(0.01) (0.005) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.003) (0.001) (0.03) (0.003) (0.02)
African 0.11 0.48 0.11 0.64 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.26 0.26 0.22
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01)
Coloured 0.13 0.33 0.26 0.43 0.23 0.12 0.03 0.24 0.19 0.22
(0.05) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.001) (0.07) (0.01) (0.08)
Indian 0.05 0.22 0.28 0.34 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.30 0.18 0.29
(0.04) (0.01) (0.11) (0.02) (0.11) (0.01) (0.001) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09)
White 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.30 0.11 0.18 0.03 0.22 0.22 0.20
(0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.001) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Table 18: Intradistributional income inequality: Theil Entropy Measure on Per Capita
Household Income, 1995-97. Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors.Challenging Cassandra 45
Income Range Decomposition Household Proportion Decomposition
Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4 Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4
1998 Total 0.13 0.56 0.38 0.82 0.37 0.16 0.06 0.53 0.36 0.48
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09) (0.004) (0.001) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07)
African 0.14 0.54 0.40 0.75 0.40 0.15 0.06 0.48 0.31 0.45
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.02) (0.18) (0.004) (0.001) (0.06) (0.005) (0.07)
Coloured 0.08 0.36 0.79 0.46 0.43 0.10 0.04 0.82 0.21 0.82
(0.04) (0.01) (0.27) (0.02) (0.18) (0.01) (0.002) (0.33) (0.01) (0.34)
Indian 0.04 0.27 0.86 0.44 0.91 0.22 0.03 0.71 0.24 0.73
(0.02) (0.02) (0.51) (0.04) (0.39) (0.04) (0.002) (0.42) (0.03) (0.44)
White 0.03 0.19 0.24 0.33 0.18 0.16 0.03 0.25 0.21 0.23
(0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.001) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
1999 Total 0.19 0.39 0.72 0.95 0.32 0.13 0.07 0.89 0.36 0.85
(0.003) (0.008) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07) (0.003) (0.001) (0.14) (0.004) (0.15)
African 0.19 0.33 0.81 0.88 0.30 0.12 0.05 1.05 0.29 1.04
(0.003) (0.01) (0.15) (0.03) (0.07) (0.003) (0.001) (0.24) (0.004) (0.25)
Coloured 0.11 0.29 0.31 0.52 0.28 0.11 0.03 1.88 0.21 1.88
(0.007) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.01) (0.001) (0.45) (0.01) (0.43)
Indian 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.15
(0.03) (0.03) (0) (0.04) (0) (0.02) (0.003) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
White 0.12 0.24 0.54 0.32 0.29 0.11 0.02 0.35 0.14 0.36
(0.03) (0.01) (0.23) (0.02) (0.12) (0.01) (0.001) (0.15) (0.01) (0.15)
2000 Total 0.09 0.49 0.20 0.77 0.15 0.11 0.05 0.41 0.30 0.34
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.002) (0.001) (0.02) (0.004) (0.02)
African 0.08 0.47 0.19 0.66 0.24 0.10 0.04 0.32 0.25 0.28
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.14) (0.003) (0.001) (0.04) (0.003) (0.04)
Coloured 0.11 0.33 0.11 0.48 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.24 0.18 0.21
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Indian 0.04 0.19 0.10 0.36 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.12
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.002) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
White 0.29 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.19 0.16 0.18
(0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.001) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Table 19: Intradistributional income inequality: Theil Entropy Measure on Per Capita
Household Income, 1998-2000. Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors.Challenging Cassandra 46
Total Household Income
Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4 Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4
1995 Total 497 3418 34174 2994 72985 575 1590 7501 1347 8972
African 495 2596 37162 2048 82427 477 1102 4191 958 4921
Coloured 538 3088 25844 2855 64150 691 1668 5210 1515 5986
Indian 587 5181 35523 5868 60418 1844 4164 12253 3554 14259
White 522 7315 33592 8529 71832 2278 5867 16437 5187 18581
1996 Total 34 646 5213 1118 7974 183 1234 3149 948 3239
African 34 625 3996 991 6557 137 853 1881 649 1888
Coloured 33 790 4571 1527 6884 487 1858 4736 1529 5093
Indian 35 884 5439 2009 8360 1218 2799 5757 2408 5994
White 31 616 8611 1716 9963 1468 5318 7425 4295 7347
1997 Total 50 1312 9552 2001 21692 342 1077 4704 909 5312
African 51 1198 7308 1559 18757 310 2004 2869 711 3192
Coloured 50 1802 7244 2757 15658 555 3637 5094 1438 5623
Indian 43 2297 9500 3858 20909 1093 5850 7838 2724 8465
White 33 2128 12434 4855 22890 1307 9399 12269 3965 13101
1998 Total 40 1684 16003 2256 46377 340 1119 4219 910 4590
African 40 1396 15355 1587 42159 302 834 2621 691 2810
Coloured 36 2381 20522 3111 107670 593 1832 7014 1563 7802
Indian 52 3114 15836 4441 40732 1034 3318 8618 2611 9180
White 43 3469 15305 6051 38270 1269 4546 8761 3741 8968
1999 Total 1278 9463 299224 2776 476448 430 1157 7375 971 8972
African 1172 8230 252994 1834 390270 389 930 4707 768 5616
Coloured 1778 8232 643232 3665 686459 689 1910 11176 1705 13328
Indian 2376 9114 xx 5598 xx 1621 4529 10815 3538 11872
White 2700 11217 165556 9343 351221 2692 7173 16080 5939 17920
2000 Total 41 1547 12686 2459 26275 484 1293 7140 1104 8472
African 51 1423 10199 1875 27751 434 1053 4214 910 4980
Coloured 25 2200 10729 3489 22133 766 1999 7336 1802 8554
Indian 31 2887 11488 5212 22913 1813 4859 13462 3941 15544
White 13 3012 15778 7611 26624 2987 8435 22021 7010 24522
Table 20: Mean Household Income. xx denotes missing values.Challenging Cassandra 47
Per Capita Household Income
Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4 Bott. 1/3 Mid. 1/3 Top 1/3 Bott. 3/4 Top 1/4
1995 Total 131 1097 13260 715 27919 125 422 2409 305 2944
African 129 718 14187 397 25641 101 268 1078 203 1305
Coloured 158 762 11667 584 39900 169 404 1289 326 1528
Indian 185 1288 11333 1393 21270 469 1065 3286 843 3861
White 170 2346 13262 2677 28687 950 2129 5809 1772 6850
1996 Total 5 165 1563 304 2866 43 296 805 216 821
African 5 153 1108 249 2337 30 201 401 147 394
Coloured 6 217 1240 398 2458 112 393 1115 313 1233
Indian 6 269 1381 548 2460 257 665 1305 517 1342
White 2 185 2494 694 3280 512 1676 2232 1314 2160
1997 Total 18 394 4757 512 12524 74 269 1291 197 1474
African 18 302 3672 313 9822 63 200 666 151 742
Coloured 18 528 3867 592 27293 137 378 1133 306 1299
Indian 22 785 4624 976 13513 273 760 1840 602 1992
White 13 1083 5084 1900 12576 496 1667 3832 1290 4052
1998 Total 12 426 6004 556 20500 77 310 1168 221 1267
African 12 311 5990 342 20713 63 226 647 161 683
Coloured 14 566 9061 649 29838 146 419 1546 335 1750
Indian 12 836 6813 1045 49641 239 770 1958 575 2112
White 15 1203 5605 1959 16918 513 1607 2795 1256 2816
1999 Total 141 1540 65265 715 176732 99 371 2697 257 3350
African 137 1086 73897 425 228435 87 858 1744 193 2164
Coloured 193 1191 137487 796 144920 174 1918 3263 380 4115
Indian 225 1545 23000 1328 xx 388 1919 3092 875 3572
White 192 2895 37873 2982 142359 1042 4241 6979 1940 7711
2000 Total 31 501 5928 707 13141 121 403 2628 288 3244
African 28 404 4977 453 11920 107 324 1486 227 1801
Coloured 13 700 4983 878 11006 203 530 2071 418 2405
Indian 13 1055 5223 1523 13504 466 1246 3885 961 4670
White 22 1596 6400 2975 28730 1231 3144 8539 2428 9708
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Figure 1: Frequency Distribution of the Income Variable, 1995 - 2000. lnpctothhinc denotes
the natural log of per capita total household income.
Figure 2: Cumulative Density Function by Year, for all Races.Challenging Cassandra 49
Figure 3: Cumulative Density Function by Race, for each Year.
































Figure 4: Per Capita Household Income: Gini Coeﬃcient by Race, Total Income Range